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Germany, the world’s third largest economy, has lagged the other eurozone economies in 
economic performance since the end of its reunification boom. That growth and employment gap 
has widened significantly during the current cyclical downturn. Germany’s stock markets have 
suffered the largest losses of those in any major economy from the bursting of the IT/telecom 
bubble, and German real estate prices have been falling for nearly a decade. Germany flirted with 
deflation in consumer prices in the last six months of 2002, even while the eurozone’s 
harmonized inflation rate has been above the European Central Bank’s (ECB) target. The 
Schröder government has publicly acknowledged the severity of the situation and simultaneously 
committed to implementing a host of labor reforms and to bringing the Federal Republic’s budget 
deficit down by 0.5-1.0 percent of GDP to adhere to the Stability and Growth Pact. And on 
February 20, 2003, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder met with the heads of Germany’s leading banks 
and the chairman of ECB’s banking supervision committee to discuss options for resolving 
financial fragility in the country’s unprofitable banking sector. The apparent parallels between 
Germany’s present troubles and some aspects of Japan’s infamous “Great Recession” have 
become a topic of wide comment and concern.
1 
This attention is deserved. Japan’s decade of decline is the worst fate suffered by an 
advanced economy since the Great Depression. Contraction in Japan, however, is not only 
Japan’s problem; it is also a drag on the global economy. Japan’s withdrawal of capital from Asia 
and a weakening yen contributed heavily to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. Since then, 
Japan’s continuing slump has limited export earnings for emerging-market countries, thus 
strengthening the backlash in Asia and Latin America against globalization and the “Washington 
Consensus,” and it is exacerbating rather than offsetting the current global slowdown. 
Japan seems unable to halt its decline even though its problems are obvious, and 
effective, albeit painful, remedies are available. But Japan’s very wealth and stability seem to be 
the sources of its inaction. In other words, there is little political pressure for change in Japan 
because it is still wealthy enough to allow a large number of Japanese citizens to travel the world 
and purchase luxury goods and also allow the government to buy off with programs those directly 
harmed by the recession, and it can still afford to put off the costs of this and other borrowing. 
Small wonder then that financial observers have wondered whether such a fate might befall other 
wealthy economies that got into trouble. When stock market bubbles burst and deflation appears 
                                                 
1 We have identified 20 such articles published in the global financial press or released by leading financial 
firms.  They are split roughly 50-50 on whether Germany will go down Japan’s road, with a couple saying 
it is completely a matter of cyclical developments.   3
in prospect, the question “Who will be the next Japan?” takes on urgency for policymakers and 
markets.  
Germany in particular has come under scrutiny for its potential to fall into a Japan-like 
trap. The apparent structural similarities and the parallel declines from being model economies to 
becoming long-term aging underperformers give some surface credibility to the analogy. As will 
be argued, these comparisons are too diffused and ignore many differences between these two 
industrial democracies and their economic behavior, and thereby fail to identify the core 
determinants of Germany’s proclivity to the Japanese disease. At the same time, Germany has 
many longer-term structural problems and simply avoiding becoming ‘the next Japan’ will not be 
sufficient to fix these drags on growth and employment. Preventing Germany from turning 
Japanese, however, would preclude an extended period of stagnation and mounting public and 
private debt, with ongoing deflation and financial fragility. That fate of persistent stagnation 
would completely block meaningful long-term reform in Germany as it has in Japan. 
Of course, the concern about any of the major economies “turning Japanese” begins with 
the recent collapse of the IT/telecom-fed global stock market bubble. But it takes more than a 
bubble to become Japan. Bubble economies can build up investment and industrial capacity in 
formerly overvalued sectors (like telecoms and IT) and then work it off in periods of slower 
growth—as the current US economic difficulties demonstrate. Mature economies can also reach 
the limits of technological catch-up or find themselves confronting choices about generous social 
welfare commitments made during times of faster growth and greater export opportunities—as 
the UK did in the 1980s, and the Netherlands and Sweden did in the 1990s. Corrupt or 
undercapitalized banking systems that misallocate credit have disrupted financial markets and 
growth in practically every economy— from the savings and loan debacle in the United States to 
the Credit Lyonnais affair in France to the widespread banking crises in the Nordic countries. In 
other words, it is possible for an advanced economy to have a bad time but still not fall into 
Japanese-style ongoing stagnation. 
For an advanced economy to perpetually stagnate, its political economy must have the 
four elements of Japan’s negative economic syndrome:  
•  incomplete financial liberalization;  
•  macroeconomic policy division and deflationary bias;  
•  financially and politically passive households; and 
•  a lack of openness to trade or capital flows or foreign ideas.  
Of all the OECD countries, only Germany has increasingly begun to share Japan’s political-
economic profile. By the end of the 1990s, Germany had witnessed to a large degree the first   4
three elements of the Japanese syndrome, and recent economic events and policies have made 
matters worse. But Germany had been spared by its long-standing openness and commitment to 
international economic integration.  
However, the fourth element is newly threatening to surface because Germany now backs 
the increasingly intergovernmental or statist approach to the European Union’s eastern 
enlargement taken by France and a few other member states in the constitutional convention.  
This approach would elevate the power and interests of the larger incumbent nation-states vis-à-
vis Brussels and the accession countries. Transatlantic relations have been strained over Iraq, and 
this strain made evident the underlying divisions within the EU, both reinforcing Germany’s 
recent political tendency to back its partnership with France as the main avenue of European 
decision-making. This is a switch from Germany’s traditional role of being the large state 
advocating federalism in the EU and the voice of the smaller states. I argue that beyond its direct 
economic effects, such a switch in Germany’s own attitude and approach to economic integration 
could well tip the country into a full-fledged Japan syndrome. 
Reliance on the US economy as the engine of growth since 1995 has created major 
imbalances in the world economy and it cannot afford its third largest economy following its 
second largest down the path to economic perdition. A deepening of Germany’s current economic 
weakness would not only add to the drag on world growth from a declining Japan, but would also 
compound it. Years of stagnation in Japan have made the global economy less resilient and 
weakened support for economic liberalization. Even looking solely at direct economic effects 
from potential stagnation in Germany, they will be disproportionately significant given 
Germany’s geopolitical position. German output accounts for  23 percent of the European 
Union’s GDP and 32 percent of the eurozone’s. The Benelux countries sell over $90 billion in 
goods and services to Germany every year, making it the engine of west European growth. From 
the strategic emerging eastern Europe, Germany takes in 8 percent of Russian exports, 19 percent 
of Turkish exports, and 31 percent of the exports from the EU accession countries—primarily 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—which is over 11 percent of the annual GDP of these 
NATO members. (See table 1.)  
Germany is the third highest contributor of official development assistance (ODA), 
averaging $5.2 billion annually from 1999 to 2001 and accounting for 12.8 percent of the G-7’s 
total net ODA, and without counting Germany’s 25 percent share of contributions to the EU 
budget, that understates its role (see table 2). If Germany were to turn Japanese, the United States 
would be deprived of a critical partner in promoting economic liberalization and integrating 
developing democracies into the global economic system—a role Japan never played. That would   5
also render even more improbable a significant increase in defense spending by the second largest 
member of NATO. For all of the Bush administration’s criticism of German “pacifism” regarding 
Iraq, Germany does contribute 5.9 percent of total NATO defense spending, and has nearly 
325,000 active military personnel (1997-2001 average; see table 3).  
To prevent Germany from turning Japanese, the United States and the other G-7 countries 
must focus on shifting eurozone macroeconomic policy toward growth, encouraging international 
banking consolidation (particularly through application of international standards to Germany), 
strengthening of Brussels vis-à-vis the large nation-states in the EU constitutional design, and 
enhancing transatlantic economic integration and openness. The US government will have to 
recognize anew, even in the midst of military conflict, that its major foreign policy and security 
goals critically depend on the economic vitality of its largest allies such as Germany. The US 
government must be willing to compromise on less important political or military issues to get the 
needed changes in economic policies from high-savings, slow-growth countries such as Germany. 
 
HOW THE JAPANESE MODEL BECAME JAPAN-THE-FATE-TO-AVOID 
What a difference a decade makes. Over the last ten years, Japanese public debt and 
unemployment levels have doubled and average economic growth has fallen by nearly three-
quarters to about 0.9 percent per year, the lowest of any industrialized economy. Bad debts in the 
Japanese banking system total an unprecedented $1 trillion (more than 20 percent of GDP) and 
are still rising. Projecting current trends, Japan will be unable to roll over its public or private 
debts and will ultimately fail to meet its internal pension and social security obligations, probably 
within just five years.
2 Even if an overt financial crisis is postponed indefinitely, more time with a 
dysfunctional financial system and therefore without sustained recovery will continue to erode 
Japan’s wealth, stability, and world role. Japan has gone from being a soft power punching above 
its weight in international relations to being an aging society of declining significance even within 
Asia. 
Worse, Japan seems unable to free itself from the tightening vise of fiscal erosion and 
debt-deflation in which its economy is caught. With each passing year of stagnation, tax revenues 
fall while public expenditure rises, limiting further the Japanese government’s scope for 
constructive fiscal policy. Debt-deflation, meanwhile, is a vicious self-reinforcing cycle, last seen 
during the 1930s in the United States, where companies and individuals hit by falling prices and 
incomes are unable to service their outstanding debt obligations and so default or sell their 
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PB02-5, May 2002.   6
marketable assets. These defaults and fire sales further drive down asset prices and dry up bank 
credit, leading to another round of failures. The bank-dominated financial system in Japan offers 
little corporate access to stock and bond markets and the resulting credit crunch has starved the 
entire economy of new investment. It has also given aging savers little or no return on their 
assets, thereby sapping consumption as well. Japan, it seems, has fallen and is unable to get up. 
Japan’s economic troubles have been neither accidental nor inevitable. Instead, they are 
the result of politically driven and economically self-defeating policy decisions that turned a 
normal recession following an asset-price bubble in 1992-94 into a severe and accelerating 
decline.
3 I now briefly summarize the four interwoven aspects of the Japanese political economy 
before assessing the extent of the similarities between the German and Japanese economies in the 
last few years. 
 
Incomplete Financial Liberalization 
The seeds of the current crisis were sown in 1984 when Japan undertook to deregulate its 
financial markets. By 1989, most leading companies could exit their bank relationships and go 
directly to markets for capital (issuing bonds, commercial paper, and stock), thus depriving 
Japanese banks of their steady business of lending to near-zero-risk clients at high margins. Yet 
even as banks lost profitable opportunities, the Ministry of Finance equated financial-system 
stability to “no closure of banks,” and financial incentives provided by a network of former 
financial officials placed in lucrative bank jobs after retirement (the famous Amakudari—descent 
from heaven) reinforced this belief. 
Consequently too many unprofitable Japanese banks have stayed in business, retaining 
large amounts of Japan’s lending funds. From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, the banks shifted 
from funding creditworthy corporations to lending to small and medium enterprises solely on the 
basis of real estate collateral—a much riskier and more cyclical business. When the stock and real 
estate bubbles that their lending helped to inflate burst in 1990-92, the banks and their borrowers 
took heavy losses, and returns to Japanese savers began their long decline. The banks have since 
ceased lending to new businesses, while holders of savings accounts and certificates of deposit at 
those banks received little or no return on their deposits.
4  
Vast public sector banks and bank-like entities in Japan, such as the national Postal 
Savings system, designed to serve bureaucrats and politicians, compounded the problem. Public 
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Posen, eds., Japan’s Financial Crisis and Its Parallels with US Experience, IIE, 2000. 
4 See Takeo Hoshi and Anil F. Kashyap, Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the 
Future, MIT Press, 2001, and the chapter by Shimizu in Mikitani and Posen, op cit.   7
banks, by definition, have a lesser need to make a profit, offer savers an implicit government 
guarantee, and have a mission to lend on non-market criteria. As a result, public-sector financial 
institutions put pressure on the profitability of private banks, by driving down their lending 
margins and driving up their cost of funds. Because overwhelming shares of both household 
savings and corporate finance are still intermediated by or held in banks in Japan, the resulting 
combination of undercapitalized private banks and bloated public banks has discouraged 
investment and distorted markets throughout the economy, thus devastating growth. 
 
Uncoordinated Deflationary Macroeconomic Policy 
In large economies, monetary and fiscal policies are usually employed to smooth out the business 
cycle. During normal recessions, the central bank cuts interest rates to make credit more readily 
available, tax revenues decline from those with declining incomes, and public spending on 
unemployment and other welfare benefits increases. In unusual circumstances, such as those 
following a stock market bubble when there is overcapacity and financial fragility, a more activist 
macroeconomic policy is undertaken: discretionary tax cuts are made, public works spending is 
often increased, and the central bank may purchase government bonds on a large scale. 
Since 1990, however, macroeconomic policy in Japan has been on balance contractionary 
and has worked to deepen rather than offset the post-bubble recession.
5 The popular but incorrect 
perception of Japanese fiscal policy is that the government has been on a public-works spending 
binge. Properly measured, however, the Japanese government has provided little added stimulus 
as the economy has contracted. Over 80 percent of the increase in Japanese public debt is due to 
tax revenue shrinking with the economy. In fact, in April 1997, taxes were raised by 2 percent of 
GDP, cutting short of nascent recovery. Then, starting in July 1999, public investment has been 
cut month over month for more than three years now. Net public investment is lower now than it 
was in 1998. Meanwhile, the Japanese safety net for the unemployed and poor is the least 
generous in the OECD, even smaller than in the United States, so automatic stabilizers are small. 
Monetary policy has been at least as contractionary and is perhaps even more 
misunderstood. The Bank of Japan was slow to cut interest rates after the bubble burst and 
                                                 
5 Japanese macroeconomic policy is assessed in Kenneth N. Kuttner and Adam S. Posen, “The Great 
Recession: Lessons for Macroeconomic Policy from Japan”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
2001:2 and Posen (1998), op cit. 
6 See Alan Ahearne, et al., “Preventing Deflation: Lessons from Japan’s Experience in the 1990’s,” Federal 
Reserve Board International Finance Discussion Paper No. 729, June 2002, and the chapter by Jinushi, 
Kuroki, and Miyao in Mikitani and Posen, op cit. 
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investment declined in the early 1990s.
6 By the time the Bank cut its overnight interest rate to 
zero in February 1999, it was too late—inflation had dropped below zero and the banking system 
broke down, making real interest rates high and credit conditions tight. Since then, the Bank has 
refused to undertake active quantitative expansion—i.e., printing yen and purchasing large 
amounts of government bonds, foreign currency, or other real assets—to increase liquidity 
outside the banking system. The result of the Bank’s willful inaction has been the first extended 
period of deflation seen in any advanced economy since the Depression. Deflation not only 
reinforces the accumulation of bad loans and the contraction of credit in a vicious feedback loop 
but also deters consumer spending since individuals wait for prices to fall further. 
The Ministry of Finance and the independent Bank of Japan have deepened the problem 
by playing a game of chicken with each other and with the financial regulators, each asking the 
other two to give in first—the Bank will not ease both until the bad loans are cleaned up and until 
the Ministry assures that clean-up funds will not be wasted on other projects; the financial 
supervisors will not close banks until the Bank of Japan and/or the Ministry of Finance provide a 
supportive macroeconomic environment in which to do so; and the Ministry will not reform the 
budget and the tax system until the Bank ends deflation and the supervisors put a limit on the bad 
loan problem. This game is in part simply a matter of not wanting to be the first to admit past 
mistakes. It also, however, reflects a lack of coordination on macroeconomic and financial policy, 
which creates a bidding war over who can maintain the most austere policies the longest. 
 
Financially and Politically Passive Citizens 
Obvious economic underperformance, fed by regulatory neglect and deflationary policies (not to 
mention overt corruption), would seem to be the cause for public outcry. But Japanese citizens 
have not yet demanded change. While prime ministers come and go, the Liberal Democratic Party 
retains leadership in the Diet and neither its members nor the bureaucrats making economic 
policies are held accountable. The selection by party caucus, not by popular election, of Junichiro 
Koizumi as prime minister in April 2001 was thought by many to signal potential reform, but 
nothing much has changed. In October 2002, Koizumi and his party gutted the first true bank 
clean-up proposal since the bubble and still picked up five seats in six by-elections. It may well be 
that Koizumi wanted to implement reforms and has been repeatedly defeated by interest group 
opposition, but clearly the Japanese populace has not punished Koizumi for that series of defeats. 
The Japanese population appears to fear major changes in established relationships more 
than economic stagnation at their current high level of wealth. This net assessment, however, 
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glosses over the raw political exploitation of the majority by powerful interest groups in Japan.
7 
Indeed, for all the talk of social solidarity, Japan is a society in which the relatively wealthy old 
exploit younger workers, politically over-represented rural residents exploit urban populations, 
and incumbent businesses and workers exploit their current relationships to exclude new entrants. 
This pernicious system is enabled and reinforced by a process in which LDP politicians funnel 
public largesse and tax breaks to these older and rural voters in return for political (and personal) 
contributions and safe re-election. Bureaucrats, meanwhile, maintain their power by assuring that 
current business and regulatory structures reinforce each other. 
Of course, all advanced societies have special interests, and farmers and pensioners often 
take advantage of the less-concentrated general public in government budget decisions. Only in 
Japan among wealthy democracies, however, among wealthy democracies, have such narrow 
interest groups so successfully snatched such a large share of national income and also managed 
to keep it coming in the face of obvious economic decline. 
The same passivity pervades the Japanese financial system. Over 90 percent of Japanese 
household financial assets are kept in bank accounts, bank certificates of deposit, life insurance, 
or cash. It is often claimed that this reflects that the Japanese are extremely risk-averse; many 
macroeconomists would argue that Japanese savings have risen as a precautionary response to the 
possibility of losing one’s job or pension as the recession continues. Whatever the source, the end 
result is that banks and life insurers in Japan effectively have captive deposits on which they can 
keep dropping the returns (now nearly zero on most accounts), while their management and 
shareholders keep their jobs and extract the dividends they can. Few households pull out their 
money in search of better investments, so banks are no more accountable than the politicians. 
This translates into little pressure to write off bad loans or lend to new businesses. 
 
Lack of Openness 
Some countries have no choice but to face their economic problems due to outside pressure, even 
if the day of reckoning is postponed for as long as possible by domestic politics. Even for large 
wealthy economies, openness matters: exit by domestic and foreign investors, regional integration 
agreements, migration, and/or expenditure requirements for national security usually force 
economies to respond to persistent economic underperformance. In Japan, though, government 
and established interests have eluded most pressures for change. Passivity is reinforced by the 
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Leonard J. Schioppa, “Japan, the Reluctant Reformer,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2001, pp. 76-
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closed nature of much of Japan’s economy and society, as reflected by its discouragement of 
immigration and the virtual absence of regional security or trade integration—there is no East 
Asian equivalent of NATO, NAFTA, or the EU. 
Japan’s lack of openness is particularly felt in the absence of economic competition for 
the bulk of its domestic businesses and of its savings to invest. I refer here not to the standard US 
trade negotiator’s demands for market access for American plate glass or apples. What is really at 
issue is the fact that 80-85 percent of the Japanese economy—particularly service sectors such as 
retail, transportation, and construction—is grossly inefficient, with thousands of politically 
protected small companies squandering Japan’s stock of economic assets.
8 Also, many larger 
manufacturing companies are insulated from competition by tight business-government 
connections, particularly of bureaucrats to middle management, and by corporate boards of 
insiders from companies with cross-shareholdings. These companies secretly transfer the cost of 
the losses from bad investments, delinquent loans, and outright waste to the Japanese consumer 
and to the 15 percent of Japanese business that is internationally competitive. 
Naturally enough, these inefficient companies have a strong interest in not only the 
substance of protection but also in maintaining the ideological pretense that Japan should have an 
economic model distinct from that of “the West.” In the end, of course, it turns out that the 
maintenance of their privileges, and that alone, is what constitutes that “distinct” model. This 
environment is hardly conducive to spread new ideas; rather, it is one that encourages the 
scapegoating of foreign pressures as being a source of difficulty, an indulgence with implications 
that go far beyond economics. 
 
GERMANY’S NEWLY JAPANESE WAYS 
These four elements of an industrial democracy’s proclivity toward the Japanese economic 
syndrome are all susceptible to independent observation  and, thankfully, it appears that most 
OECD members have avoided them. But the notable and increasingly dangerous exception is 
Germany. 
Many commentators have suggested that Germany is especially susceptible to the 
Japanese disease because of the apparent structural similarities of the German and Japanese 
economies. Both were beneficiaries of US reconstruction and open markets after World War II. 
Both are one-time exemplar economies whose growth rates slowed in the 1980s and fell on 
increasingly hard times in the 1990s. Both are self-described “consensus” or “stakeholder” 
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societies that organize much of their economic decision-making around tight business-bank ties 
and collaborative corporate governance. Both de-emphasize stock markets. Both are aging 
societies with high domestic rates of savings, high labor productivity, and low returns on capital. 
And both have been and remain critically dependent on exports for growth. 
These longer-term structural similarities are misleading, for they do not and did not 
foreordain similar behavior by policymakers and citizens in Germany and Japan. Until the late 
1990s, there were in fact significant differences in the functioning of the two economies. Postwar 
West Germany was always more market-friendly than Japan, even after the liberal architect of the 
Sozialmarktwirtschaft, Ludwig Erhard, left office in 1966. While certainly more regulated than 
the United States, in contrast to Japan, most individual German business decisions were not 
directly influenced by government intervention, and German civil servants tended to stay in 
government rather than join companies—direct business-government ties were limited. Germany 
also allowed more competition, both domestic and foreign: on the trade side, the value of 
Germany’s imports and exports comprise nearly twice the share of its economy as in Japan, and 
foreign direct investment into and out of Germany is six times that of Japan (figures 1 and 2).
9 
German banks did play a dominant role in corporate finance and savings, but were allowed 
occasionally to fail or be taken over; and German bank supervisors were strict.
10 
The electorate held German politicians accountable for economic performance, as well. 
The decentralized federal political system, installed by the occupying Allied powers, allotted a 
strong role in determining policy to the opposition in the Bundesrat and in the Länder (state) 
governments. This gave German citizens a sense of political responsiveness that never developed 
in the one-party, bureaucrat-dominated postwar Japanese political system. The generous 
distribution of government spoils to average German workers and consumers too, usually through 
universal welfare programs, reflected the fact that political power in Germany lay with the 
majority and not, as in Japan, with business management and select interest groups. 
Most important, Germany was always more engaged internationally than Japan. This was 
in large part due to political geography, with West Germany in NATO and on the Cold War’s  
 
 
                                                 
9 The data used for the foreign direct investment figures are stock data from the international investment 
position statistics from the IFS.  The first figure shows only the country's direct investment abroad as a 
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direct investment in the economy as a percent of GDP.  
10See the list of bank failures in Germany released by the Bundesbank in April 2002. 
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front line. A partial welcome to resident foreigners, from Turkish Gästarbeitern to US troops,  
added to the sense of openness. (Japan has also hosted resident US troops, of course, but they 
have been allowed much less social influence in Japan than their counterparts in Germany.) This 
was also because of enlightened leadership by a succession of German chancellors, strongly 
backed by a majority of Germans, who simultaneously pursued European integration and the 
maintenance of transatlantic ties. Membership in the EU, in turn, was then a force for economic 
liberalization, at least within the single market. In essence, Germany’s postwar 
Wirtschaftswunder and reintegration into the West was a victory of globalization. 
Nevertheless, as with Japan in 1990-92, Germany’s main concern now is how to respond 
to a bubble and its recessionary aftermath. Germany has experienced a real stock market crash—
on October 9, 2002, the DAX index was 68 percent off its March 2000 peak (as opposed to a 49 
percent drop in the analogous US S&P 500 index over the same peak-to-trough period), and the 
Neuer Markt, Germany’s NASDAQ market, will be completely shut down by year-end 2003 due 
to the collapse of the vast majority of its listed companies (see figure 3 that shows an identical 
path for the Nikkei, rising and declining nine-fold, ten years earlier). Germany also confronts a 
severe slowdown: since the post-reunification boom of 1990-92, Germany has beaten Italy for the 
distinction of being the slowest growing economy in the EU, growing at an average rate of 1.3 
percent a year. In 2002, the German economy grew a mere 0.2 percent, and the government’s 
own revised forecast for real growth in 2003 is only 1.0 percent, which is insufficient to keep 
public deficits and unemployment from rising further. This is the objective situation. How are 
German economic decision-makers likely to handle it? 
To find out what policy decisions will be made, it is important to focus on the key 
elements of the Japanese syndrome, and not just reel off a laundry list of apparent long-term 
similarities between Japan and Germany. On the first element of Japanese-type stagnation--
incomplete financial liberalization--there is real cause to worry about Germany. In theory, 
because Germany always had universal banks, there was little to deregulate in terms of bank 
activities, and banks were already well diversified and so better able to handle shocks. Banks’ 
hidden reserves, comprised of unrealized capital gains on shareholdings of non-financial 
companies and retained dividends, were supposed to provide cushions to capital adequacy. 
However, German financial markets have been in a state of transition in recent years akin to that 
which preceded the US S&L crisis in the 1980s and Japan’s banking problems of the 1990s. The 
interest rate spread for banks, a key marker of profitability and competition, declined from around 
2 percent through 1985 down to 1.2 percent in 2001 (and has lowered since; see figure 4). For the   13
German universal banks, just as for the post-Glass-Steagall US bank-holding companies, 
diversified lines of business have not defended them against cyclical losses. 
Like Japan, Germany is not only a high-savings country but also one where savers 
increasingly put their money into bank accounts even as returns decline. Germany’s deposit-to-
GDP ratio is the highest in Europe (rock steady at 1:1 over the last decade) and total deposits 
have grown sevenfold in the last 20 years, while the economy itself only grew by about 60 
percent, and average interest paid on deposits declined from 4 to 2 percent.
11 German banks are 
now lending a growing, and now the largest, share of these ample loanable funds--totaling four 
times the amount lent in 1980--to the non-financial services sector comprising a set of less 
productive small and medium enterprises; these loans, as in Japan, are secured mainly by real 
estate collateral of declining worth (see figure 5).
12 Employment growth in services (from 54.9 
percent of total employment in 1991 to 62.6 percent in 2000) and profitability in this sector were 
certainly far from suffic ient to justify such a credit expansion. This trend in lending patterns is 
consistent with a profit-chasing reallocation boom as seen in Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Reminiscent of Japan, this lending growth has occurred while Germany’s more stable and 
profitable export-oriented manufacturing sector has steadily raised a greater share of its funds by 
going directly to foreign markets with securities on offer. As a result, the profitability of German 
banks’ loan portfolios has fallen and the riskiness of its loans has risen beyond cyclical changes. 
Figure 6 shows the declining ratio of bank liquid assets to liabilities in Germany, now having 
reached current Japanese levels at below 1.5:1 (in the 1980s, Germany averaged a ratio of 3:1). 
Germany’s tough labor laws restricting the firing of workers limit the ability of the banks to 
improve profitability internally, much as the Japanese banks feel bound to retain their “lifetime 
employment” workforces. For private banks, times have been particularly tough. Table 4 
compares average financial performance from 1997-2001 for the largest German banks with that 
of the largest private eurozone banks outside of Germany. The German banks are far below their 
eurozone competitors (let alone those in London or New York) in the key ratios of liquid assets to 
short-term funding, return on assets, and return on equity. Just as in Japan, the number of German 
banks has not declined to restore profitability in the banking sector. There are still over 300 
commercial banks of various sizes, over 520 Sparkassen (public savings banks), and 1,500 
cooperative banks (only the latter category has been noticeably shrinking). While the 
                                                 
11 All data cited in this paragraph is taken from Deutsche Bundesbank publications. 
12 The Bundesbank's definition for non-financial services is: “Non-financial services include housing 
enterprises, holding companies, other real estate enterprises, restaurants and hotels, computer and related 
activities, research and development (plus other business activities (except investment companies)), health,   14
Bundesbank’s published list of postwar bank failures in Germany is long, it lists only two failures 
since 1997. This number is strikingly low in a time when more than an average number of failures 
could be expected as a result of market discipline, pressures for consolidation (including across 
EU borders), and recent volatility.
13 The end result of persistent overbanking is to deprive 
Germany’s big banks of any profitable retail franchise--less than 4 percent of all savings accounts 
are held at the Grossbanken, and 14 percent of corporate/household loans are channeled through 
them. The Sparkassen meanwhile account for more than 50 percent of savings deposits and 16 
percent of lending.
14  
As in Japan, public banks and special credit entities—including the Sparkassen, their 
clearing banks (the half state-owned, half Sparkassen-owned Landesbanken), and the 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (the one-time Marshall fund bank, with an AAA-rating and $250 
billion in assets, which is now a means for the federal government to send more credit to the 
Mittelstand and to pursue chosen projects off-budget)—play a significant role in the financial 
system. These public banks carry the advantage of a state guarantee, and therefore a lower cost of 
funds, as well as non-profit criteria for lending. This puts them in unfair competition with 
Germany’s private banks, further eroding the latter’s profitability. The EU has recognized that 
this system is anti-competitive and has legislated that the Landesbanken gradually phase out their 
state guarantees starting in 2005. But that ensures at least another two years of eroding private 
bank capital and also assumes that the partial privatization of these popular government 
institutions will be implemented on time in the face of domestic resistance rather than be 
renegotiated by the German government. 
Not surprisingly, then, adverse selection has become visible in the German financial 
system. As asset prices fall, new borrowers experience a credit crunch, collateral and balance 
sheets of current borrowers are impaired, and banks reduce lending. A standard marker of credit 
conditions is the spread between government bonds and corporate bonds of equivalent maturity—
when this spread widens, borrowers have greater trouble getting loans. In Germany, the spread 
between ten-year government and highly rated corporate bonds averaged 0.3 percent between 
January 1980 and May 1998, and rarely went above 0.7 percent for more than a month, even 
during recessions. Since June 1998, when German banks began to incur losses from the Asian 
                                                                                                                                                 
veterinary and social work (enterprises and the professions), letting of movables and other services.  From 
1999, this category has included finance leasing institutions.” 
13 “Bankzusammenbrüche in Deutschland,” Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report, April 2002. The 
failures/closures since 1950 are listed chronologically. Since the failure of the German Herstatt bank in 
1974, there have been 60 failures/closures but only 12 since 1989 (including the German branch of BCCI) 
and only four since 1995. 
14 Bundesbank data reported in “That sinking feeling,” Economist, February 20, 2003.   15
financial crisis and then the Russian default, the risk spread has been steadily rising. As of 
September 2002, the spread was a hefty 1.7 percent, having averaged 1.3 percent in the preceding 
year. The comparable US risk spread also widened along a similar time frame but only went up 
by 58 basis points on a higher (0.72) initial base, whereas the German spread has increased by 
138 percent. 
This increase can be credibly linked to declining German bank capital. The national 
average bank financial strength rating, removing the effect of government guarantees, is now 
below C+ according to Moody’s rating agency—in other words, sub-investment grade. Every 
other EU country’s banking system except that of Greece has a higher average rating. 
Provisioning for the coming losses on non-performing loans in a time of declining profits will 
further erode German banks’ capital base. A German banking leader remarked to the US press in 
October 2002, “We’re not talking about a liquidity problem...What we are talking about is a lack 
of profitability.”
15 Edgar Meister, the widely respected head of the ECB’s banking supervision 
committee, was even more explicit following the February 20, 2003, meeting called by 
Chancellor Schröder to discuss whether public action was needed to deal with bad loans:  
 
“I remain confident that German banks will be able to resolve specific weaknesses 
 on their own. Anyway this is not at all the time to discuss the use of taxpayers’ money. 
The stability of the German financial system as well as the banks’ liquidity are [sic] 
 out of question.”
16 
 
It is accurate to point out that the risk of a financial breakdown or even abnormal 
interbank liquidity problems in Germany is negligible in 2003, but the same thing could have 
been said of Japan’s banks at the start of the post-bubble years. A few consecutive years of low 
profitability creates a lack of capital, ultimately leading to distorted credit decisions and the 
accumulation of bad loans. Germany today, like Japan circa 1992, has too many banks with too 
little capital but no significant exit of savers or public sector competitors. Similarly, it is entirely 
commendable to put the burdens of rebuilding capital on the large private banks themselves but if 
those banks are deemed to big too fail—and the means of rebuilding capital remain constrained 
by unfair competition from public-sector banks—the result could be unintentional forbearance 
while the situation worsens. Remember, for Germany in 2002-03 the appropriate comparison is to 
                                                 
15 Rolf E. Breuer, Chairman of the Aufsichtsrat of Deutsche Bank, quoted in “In Germany, Banks Mirror 
Wide Malaise in Economy,” Mark Landler, New York Times, October 22, 2002, p. W1. 
16 “Statement by Edgar Meister on the current situation of the German banking sector,” Deutsche 
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Japan in 1992-94, before the majority of Japan’s private banks were insolvent or there was any 
significant accumulation of bad loans raising the need for a ‘bad bank.’ 
In the past four years, German macroeconomic policy, the second indicator to watch, has 
also become distressingly parallel to that of Japan. Until 1999, German monetary policy was quite 
flexible and helped to stabilize the real economy, while German fiscal policy was well within G-7 
norms for counter-cyclicality.
17 Since European monetary unification at the start of 1999, 
however, German monetary policy has been set by the European Central Bank, and German fiscal 
policy has been constrained by the eurozone’s Stability and Growth Pact. With the ECB replacing 
the Bundesbank, Germany has suffered from a centrally set monetary policy aimed at the 
eurozone in general, rather than set to its own needs.
18 
While the German inflation rate has averaged 1.5 percent annually since January 1, 1999, 
and averaged just below zero percent over the last six months of 2002, the ECB has been reluctant 
to cut interest rates, referring to harmonized inflation rates above the 2 percent target. The impact 
of ECB monetary policy on Germany arguably diminishes as it approaches deflation while 
suffering from banking sector weakness. Under legitimate pressure to rebuild their capital, cash-
strapped German banks have not passed the ECB’s latest interest rate cuts to borrowers, another 
marker of Japan-like bank weakness.
19 Were Germany setting its own monetary policy, the 
Bundesbank might well seek to steepen the yield curve, much in the manner the Federal Reserve 
did to aid with the resolution of the US savings and loan crisis; for the ECB committed to an 
inflation target of 2 percent or less, and without a financial stability mandate, incurring such a rise 
in inflation expectations would be dereliction of duty.
  
There is an open debate over whether the ECB has ended up being more reluctant to ease 
credit for Germany than the Bundesbank would have been under similar economic conditions.
20 
A UBS Warburg analysis, based on OECD data on output gaps and real interest rates, suggests 
                                                 
17 For discussion of German monetary policy, see Thomas Laubach and Adam Posen, “Disciplined 
Discretion: Lessons from the German and Swiss Monetary Frameworks,” Princeton Essays in International 
Finance, No. 206, 1997; and Richard Clarida and Mark Gertler, “How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary 
Policy,” NBER Working Paper 5581, May 1996.  Posen (1998), chapter 2, op cit, compares OECD 
members’ fiscal policy countercyclicality. 
18 Observing that macroeconomic policy set on an eurozone-wide basis could still exacerbate Germany’s 
divergent growth path need not imply any criticism of the EU’s policymakers evaluated in terms of their 
stated mission.  One might consider, however, questions that divergence raises about that mission. 
19 “German banks ignore ECB cut,” Andreas Krosta, Financial Times, January 14, 2003, p. 16; “Feeling the 
Crunch,” Economist, February 1, 2003, p. xx; “Rate-Cut Row Shows German Bank Dilemma – Calls to 
Improve Margins Are Countered by Pressure to Lower Price of Credit,” Marcus Walker, Wall Street 
Journal Europe, January 21, 2003, p. M1. 
20 Some estimates find that the ECB should have cut interest rates up to one hundred basis points more than 
it did since early 2001.  See Michael Mussa, “Global Economic Prospects,” IIE Policy Brief, No. PB02-5, 
September 2002.   17
that a Taylor rule-based neutral policy for Germany in 2003 would be a full point below that of 
the euro area as a whole.
21 JP Morgan economists David Mackie and Silvia Pepino claim that 
“since 1999, the ECB’s policy rate has on average been almost 1 percentage point too high for 
Germany. But by the fourth quarter of [2002], the ECB’s policy rate was almost 2 percentage 
points too high.”
22 Noted monetary economists, however, including Jordi Gali, Jon Faust and 
their respective co-authors, have argued empirically that the ECB has erred on the side of ease in 
comparison to Taylor rules estimated on eurozone data with Bundesbank parameters; in fact, 
Faust, et al. argue that ECB monetary policy was closest to being in line with the rule for France 
and Germany, with the interest rate too low (by 200 basis points) even for those two member 
economies.
23 
Beyond the debate over current estimates, in terms of dealing with a member country 
with significantly divergent performance, the ECB’s pursuit of an inflation target of 2 percent or 
less for a weighted average of eurozone economies has three inherent difficulties. First, the “or 
less” target, instead of a symmetrical one of around 2 percent, imparts an additional deflationary 
bias, leading the ECB to be more aggressive in offsetting price rises than declines so long as the 
average is above 2 percent; this may also instill an attitude of lower is always better even near or 
below the 2 percent target.  
Second, the target level is set too low for a eurowide average. The smaller and the 
structurally reforming EU economies should be experiencing higher inflation as they adapt, and 
the larger and developed economies (like Germany) could have to therefore average substantially 
less than 2 percent on an ongoing basis (which in practice is actually deflation, given the positive 
bias of all inflation measures)—the range of European inflation rates over the last four years has 
been on the order of 3 percent, while that of the US states has been only 1 percent, and the 
European standard deviation of inflation rates has been twice as high.
24  
Third, given the lack of synchronization between the business cycles of eurozone 
economies and of fiscal transfers among the economies, some countries will always suffer from  
                                                 
21 UBS Warburg European Economics, “The Year Ahead in Europe,” Global Economic and Strategy 
Research, December 20, 2002, pp. 12-18. 
22 David Mackie and Silvia Pepino, “Germany’s stagnation is beyond its control,” Financial Times, 
February 26, 2003. 
23 See Jordi Gali, “Monetary Policy in the Early Years of EMU,” mimeo, CREI and Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra, May 2002, and Jon Faust, John H. Rogers, and Jonathan H. Wright, “An Empirical Comparison  
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24 UBS Warburg European Economics, “The Year Ahead in Europe,” Global Economic and Strategy 
Research, December 20, 2002, pp. 12-18.   18
 
significant divergences between ECB policy and their own cyclical needs. Especially with 
countries like Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, and (to a lesser degree) France on sustained trends 
of improvement in growth and unemployment, while countries like Germany and Italy are on 
secular growth downtrends, monetary policy will not simply balance out over time. It will be 
chronically tight for the slower economies and will reinforce their slowdown. Moreover, now that 
Germany is in a currency bloc with the majority of its trading partners, it cannot loosen its 
monetary conditions by adjusting its exchange rate either to make up for excessively high interest 
rates. Instead, deflation becomes the adjustment mechanism for relative national price levels.
25 
The question is what the real economy suffers in that process if nominal rigidities are high (as 
they are in Germany) and the financial system is both bank-dependent and fragile (as also is the 
case in today’s Germany). 
Meanwhile, on the fiscal side, the Schröder government has proposed raising taxes during 
the current recession in the hope of bringing the budget deficit back down to the Stability and 
Growth Pact target of 3 percent of GDP. The EU’s Stability and Growth Pact has a built-in 
destabilizing bias: the larger a recession, the more likely an economy is to breach the 3 percent 
cap on deficits; once it approaches that limit, meaning the more likely it is to exceed the deficit 
cap, the more tax increases or spending cuts must be pursued. Recent proposals to measure the 
deficit on a cyclically adjusted basis would offset this bias somewhat, but as long as the rule 
remains in place, mandating a rapid return to deficits of below 3 percents, fiscal policy will choke 
recovery by tightening policy as soon as growth and tax revenues pick up—repeating on a smaller 
scale Japan’s mistake of 1997.
26 
Some countries, like France, have defied the Pact and simply put off meeting the deficit 
targets. The German government, however, has explicitly abjured such measures since its 
politicians were the ones who insisted upon having public debt and deficit limits built into the 
Maastricht Treaty and the EMU in the first place. They did so in order to (in their minds) prevent 
fiscal indiscipline from subverting the stability of the euro. The German government has thus 
painted itself into a corner of austerity, for it has echoed both the European Commission and the 
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ECB and characterized any loosening of the Stability and Growth Pact as an indication that 
markets should discount the euro’s stability.
27  
Perhaps the most chilling parallel between post-EMU Germany and post-1992 Japan on 
macroeconomic policy is in the lack of coordination between fiscal and monetary policymakers in 
the eurozone. As with the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank refuses to loosen monetary 
policy sufficiently or to believe that stronger growth is sustainable without inflation until elected 
governments pursue structural reforms. And the ECB is on record that it will view any loosening 
of or non-adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact as undermining monetary stability, and will 
be likely to tighten policy in response. In the eurozone, however, the ECB is playing chicken with 
not just one but twelve sets of politicians and bureaucrats. And the German Ministry of Finance 
alone, among those dozen national fiscal authorities, feels the need to self-impose austerity in 
order to set an example, even though its fiscal discipline alone will be insufficient to convince the 
ECB to ease policy in return. The result is that German fiscal policy discipline will not be 
rewarded with ECB easing of monetary policy. 
 
TWO DOWN, TWO TO GO? 
Today Germany already has in place the first two components of what fed Japan’s decline a 
decade ago—incomplete financial liberalization and an uncoordinated deflationary 
macroeconomic policy—with the combined negative shock of a stock market crash, declining 
real estate prices, end of a credit boom, and global economic slowdown, which were needed to set 
the full “declinist” syndrome in motion. What, then, of the third element? Are German 
households sufficiently passive financially and politically to allow this process to gain 
momentum? Increasingly so, but not irreversibly. 
On the political side, reunification has diversified and fragmented the composition of the 
German workforce, and both the pork-barrel benefits of government programs and the protections 
of government regulations have become more narrowly distributed as a result. Demands for 
protection due to the sustained growth slowdown, declining employment in some manufacturing 
sectors (as in Japan, these are the most efficient and export-competitive businesses in Germany, 
while backward sectors retain unneeded employees), and the rising number of long-term 
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unemployed people have reinforced a change in Germany from dispensing mostly universal 
benefits to more targeted interest-group rents.
28  
Notably, there are fewer traditionally unionized workers but the relative benefits of being 
such a worker versus working elsewhere or being unemployed have increased. This development 
allies long-term German employees and uncompetitive companies to maintain the status quo and 
protect specific businesses—and the protection of those businesses includes maintenance of their 
credit lines from either state-supported or uncompetitive banks, just as in Japan. Meanwhile, the 
long-term unemployed, particularly in the former East Germany, who have little hope of finding 
good union jobs, have no interest in challenging the system of protections so long as the 
unemployment benefits and regional public-works keep coming. 
Thus, as in Japan, Germany now has special-interest blocs that exploit the average 
German and are capable of vetoing change. Meanwhile, ECB decisions on monetary policy, and 
decisions of the European ministers on the Stability and Growth Pact’s fiscal rules, are so far 
removed from democratic control, let alone anything German voters can directly affect, that the 
decision-making process itself feeds political passivity about macroeconomic policy. Also in 
contrast to all the German national elections since the mid-1960s, the September 2002 election 
offered little choice to voters on economic and social policies between the two major parties’ 
platforms. Unsurprisingly, turnout was down, the electoral shares of the SPD and the CDU/CSU 
differed by only tenths of a percentage point, and political cynicism rose sharply. The February 2, 
2003, state elections in Hesse and Niedersachsen offer some hope, not so much because the 
Social Democrats lost ground but because they indicated a renewal of the German electorate’s 
willingness to express frustration in politics and hold the government accountable. Yet, in these 
elections, too, voter turnout reached historical lows.
29 The next step depends on whether in 
practice, with a divided Bundestag and Bundesrat, this will result in policy change or deadlock 
(the latter of course will feed frustration anew if it happens).  
On the financial side, too, recent events have taken a toll on German savers’ willingness 
to move their capital out of German banks, or out of Germany altogether. The privatization of 
Deutsche Telekom in 1999 was meant to be the first step in the creation of an Aktienkultur (stock-
holding culture) in Germany.  The creation of the Neuer Markt and a unified Deutsche Börse 
were meant to take advantage of this increased demand for equities, thus deepening the market. 
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At peak, however, only 10 percent of German households held stocks or stock funds, even after 
these initiatives.
30 Unfortunately, the telecom collapse has imposed huge losses on Deutsche 
Telekom shareholders in a very short time, and for many Germans this was their first and major, 
if not only, stock holding. Those few who took speculative risks on “new economy” stocks in the 
Neuer Markt were similarly burnt and are now held up as cautionary examples.  
Many wealthier Germans had moved savings abroad to secret accounts in Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, and other centers of bank privacy, but on December 16, 2002, Chancellor Schröder 
announced a new combined flat tax on savings interest and temporary tax amnesty to bring those 
funds home. Average Germans, particularly the elderly, share with their Japanese counterparts an 
aversion to risking their money abroad—or even any place beyond the neighborhood savings 
bank. Consumption growth has been on a downward trend for most of the last decade, outpacing 
the stagnation in real incomes (see figure 8; note the brief spike after reunification). 
Corporate governance scandals in the United States have further reinforced popular 
longstanding German suspicions about financial speculation. This most inopportune increase in 
risk aversion and bank dependence in Germany happens to coincide with EU efforts to integrate 
Europe’s banking markets, open Germany’s corporations to hostile takeovers, and remove the 
privileges of the Landesbanken. Germany’s uncompetitive public banks, and small businesses 
dependent on those banks for credit, are taking advantage of this fortuitously timed (for them) bad 
press for “Anglo-Saxon finance capitalism” to pressure their government to resist such 
liberalization.
31 Germany appears to be following Japan on the third step of the path to perdition--
financial and political passivity in response to the first two steps (banking system breakdown and 
deflationary macroeconomic policy). 
The pressing need for reform is now being acknowledged in the German public debate, 
but it remains to be seen whether that will translate into significant political pressure for painful 
and politically difficult changes. The key is Germany’s openness. Germany--as a member of 
NATO, EU, and eurozone; as a major recipient and source of foreign direct investment (see 
figures 1 and 2), and as an immigrant-receiving country (despite some misgivings)--starts out 
much better prepared on this front than Japan. Market forces have always been pushed back to 
protect politically connected local companies, though in the last few years the bailouts, subsidies, 
and ownership protections have been particularly frequent and high-profile—for example, in the 
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cases of Philipp Holzmann, Mobilcom, Mannesmann, Bankgesellschaft Berlin, and Volkswagen. 
But some form of such protection exists in all countries.  
A more pressing question is whether this recent wave of domestic-company protection 
will interact with Germany’s compassion fatigue, having given the Neuen Bundesländer and the 
converging EU states huge transfers through the years. Intra-Germany transfers from the west to 
the former DDR Länder have amounted to 4 percent of Germany’s GDP a year. Net contributions 
to the EU budget have been another half a percent of GDP annually, the second highest 
contribution by share of GDP (after Sweden).
32 If the Germans view expansion to the 
transitioning low-wage east with alarm and cut back on their openness and net financial support 
of the EU, this could well feed greater protectionism and economic nationalism in the process.  
Germany could on its own, perhaps in a de facto grand coalition between CDU and SPD, 
consolidate its banking system, push for looser fiscal and monetary policies, and revitalize 
consumption by its population. But policy capabilities and economic developments in these areas 
all depend critically upon the actions taken by the European Commission and EU ministers. 
While such openness and commitment through Brussels to multinational reform are Germany’s 
key hope—which was absent in the Japanese case--EU policymaking trends are mostly heading 
in the wrong direction right now. The European Union’s constitutional convention, led by former 
French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, has sought to enhance the power of nation-states—
particularly of the largest states in the EU, France, and Germany—vis-à-vis the European 
Commission and the Parliament in the face of EU’s expansion to include ten new members from 
eastern Europe. Compounding this promotion of national identity in EU leadership is, of course, 
the divide within the European Union’s foreign policy over the United States and Iraq.  
Tending toward the statist/intergovernmental end (as opposed to the federalist end) of the 
constitutional spectrum increases the likelihood of German economic decline in four ways: 
•  first, by weakening the European Commission, it will impede Brussels’ independent efforts to 
push liberalization (including of banking) on unwilling European governments; 
•  second, by making decision-making in the EU more akin to that in the US Senate, horse-
trading and logrolling will promote national champions and bailouts rather than healthy 
compromises; 
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•  third, by stunting the development of the European Parliament’s competencies to promote 
rules by negotiations between national ministers instead, it will magnify the EU’s democratic 
deficit, making citizens in Germany and elsewhere still more passive about economic policy; 
•  and fourth, by placing a premium on state leadership, with France at the forefront, the 
establishment of a distinct international EU identity—including a foreign policy divergent 
from that of the United States—will become the priority rather than the costlier internal 
development of the accession countries and less populist international integration. 
 
Combine these effects with the likely combative response of the ECB to any political measures 
that the Council of Ministers would undertake to slow economic reform in Europe, and Germany 
ends up fulfilling all four determinants of Japan-style stagnation. Of course, Germany has 
traditionally advocated federalism within the EU, as illustrated by the speech of Foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer in May 2000 calling for a single president as the EU executive.
33 With the recent 
French/German bilateral and exclusionary deals made on agricultural policy, and relations with 
Iraq, this historic German tendency cannot be taken for granted. Every time the economically 
strapped Germany of today is reminded of its disproportionate net funder (rather than recipient) 
status with regard to the EU budget, and with the smaller countries calling for more voice in EU 
decision-making propose to enhance or maintain their net receipts, Franco-German dominance 
becomes more appealing. Transatlantic foreign policy discord reinforces that feeling. 
 
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS 
There is room for the US government to forestall this development in Germany and in Europe, and 
there is good reason for it to do so. Expanding growth in the major economies should be a foreign 
policy priority. We have already seen the difficulties facing US foreign policy in East Asia caused by 
Japanese stagnation: withdrawal from the region of Japanese export demand, credit, technology 
transfers, and investment; economic contraction in 1997-99 throughout those markets, causing a 
decline in living standards and shifting of cheap exports to the US market; post-crisis political 
instability in Indonesia and varying degrees of anti-Americanism from Malaysia to South Korea as a 
result of scapegoating “failed” US/IMF policies; resistance to further multilateral trade liberalization 
and economic integration; Japan’s withdrawal from leadership even as a donor with soft power; and the 
enhanced opportunities for China to cultivate dominance in the region as a result.  
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We can ill afford a similar destabilizing sequence taking place among the NATO members of 
eastern Europe, along Russia’s border, and in Turkey and North Africa. That is, however, what will 
happen if the German economy does become the next Japan. And it is likely to be worse than what 
happened in East Asia for three reasons. First, global economic distress cumulates both directly and 
politically—if we add German decline and Eastern European or Mediterranean economic instability to 
that already experienced in East Asia in 1997-99 (and occurring at present in Latin America), the 
effects on global growth will worsen, and the political reaction against market economics will increase. 
Second, as previously noted, Germany is more geopolitically influential than Japan because its 
economy is more integrated with its neighbors, it has a significant military presence within NATO, and 
it has generally played a large role in supporting US multilateral initiatives (the obvious exception 
being treatment of Saddam’s Iraq, but including deployment of troops in Kosovo and Afghanistan).  
Third, the timing of Germany to potentially fall into Japan’s trap is most inauspicious. The US 
economy is no longer growing at the same speed as it was during the Asian financial crisis, and cannot 
afford to take in a growing amount of imports indefinitely, let alone increase its current account deficit 
by importing more from emerging markets, especially while cutting public savings by undertaking a 
war budget. Yet formerly liberalizing, now economically frustrated, governments throughout East Asia, 
Latin America, and, if Germany goes, eastern Europe are looking for additional evidence they can use 
to blame their economic travails upon Western indifference or laissez-faire. Additionally, in a climate 
of transatlantic dispute, with unilateralism in the United States and a direct challenge from France and 
Germany, one can imagine extreme politicization of any export adjustments, movements in the dollar-
euro rate, or of aid efforts either multilateral or in occupied countries. 
Thus, while security goals may indeed be ultimately more important than economic ones for 
American national interests, as the Bush administration entered office proclaiming, the economic 
policies of the US and our major allies are critical to achieving those security goals. This is clearly 
underappreciated in current US foreign policy. Preventing Germany from going further down Japan’s 
path should be our primary foreign economic policy priority, and one of our main security priorities 
overall. German economic underperformance has a direct negative effect on security relations even 
narrowly defined: some of Germany’s declared pacifism and open conflict with the United States was 
induced by the inability to date of the Schröder government to deliver on its economic promises, 
increasing the need for an international distraction. The hectoring rhetoric of the Bush administration 
emphasizing perceived transatlantic differences and American superiority, accepting German economic 
troubles as the result of its being “Old Europe,” rather than trying to bring the economy up, do not help. 
Finally, there are those who are ideologically or self-interestedly opposed to globalization associated   25
with Americanization, who are taking advantage of the German slowdown to attack market economics 
and the United States for promoting it.  
Given the importance of swinging German economic performance, and German views on EU 
integration, here are four steps that the United States can take to pursue this priority.  
First, practice reverse linkage. Making better economic performance of Germany and other 
allies a security goal means practicing linkage of progress on this front to US cooperation in other issue 
areas, rather than artificially separating “high” and “low” politics. This reverses the famous economic 
linkage of US-Soviet détente, where political concessions by the Soviets were rewarded by trade deals. 
Japan has demonstrated how a country that runs a trade surplus and has vast national savings to start 
will not have any obvious barrier to continue running deflationary policies, and the United States has 
little direct economic leverage on such a country. US foreign policy under both Clinton and Bush has 
sometimes successfully moved Japanese economic policymakers to act when a broader front of public 
diplomatic and security pressures linked Japan’s delivery on pro-growth policies to other things desired 
by Japan.
34 Such pressures proved almost uniformly unsuccessful when issue areas were not linked to 
broader foreign policy. The same would apply to a deflationary high-savings Germany. 
Second, encourage a more federalist Europe. Giscard and the French statists have not yet won 
with their vision for a Europe led by national prime ministers, with influence weighted by state size. In 
fact, most of the smaller and the accession countries have favored a federalist Europe with a 
strengthened executive and European Parliament, and are against a big state dominion of 
intergovernmental EU decision-making. Of course, this is a matter of choice along a spectrum from 
federalist to statist/intergovernmental, not a zero-one decision, and the choice will be made by the 
elected representatives of the EU member states. Nonetheless, before the terms of European 
reorganization are set by the end of 2003, the United States can hold out the carrot for greater 
recognition of the EU in international organizations (the IMF, the UN Security Council, etc.) as well as 
the prospect of more extensive bilateral coordination, conditional on Europe moving in a more 
federalist direction. In so doing, the United States can support its many European friends among the 
small countries in this debate and change the incentives of those policymakers who remain swingable, 
with Germany foremost among them. It is a credible offer that the United States would deliver 
additional standing in international forums for a more federalist EU because then the EU would lean 
towards speaking with a single voice, but a voice forced to represent a responsible compromise position 
                                                 
34 See “On U.S. Pressures for Improved Japanese Macroeconomic Policies,” A comment to Future 
Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward Japan, Independent Task Force Report, Council on Foreign 
Relations, New York, September 2000.   26
(and not that of, say, neo-Gaullist France).
35 Put differently, if US economic and foreign policy were 
key to encouraging the initial development of European integration, why should the United States stand 
aside with so much at stake at the time of Europe’s constitutional convention?  
Third, play to Germany’s traditional postwar values. Moving from the general precepts of 
means and relations with Europe to specifically German-American relations, American foreign policy 
can benefit from a call to Germany’s recent past. Since the 1950s Germany has been committed to a 
federalist rather than a statist/intergovernmentalist Europe. Until its most recent economic troubles gave 
it assistance fatigue, Germany had championed the cause of European supra-national decision-making 
in response to first Mediterranean (Greece, Portugal, Spain) and then eastern enlargement, conditioning 
the entry of new members on sensible economic criteria. Germany also was repeatedly in consort with 
the United Kingdom to support liberalizing reforms on the continent. If the United States appeals to 
Germany’s sense of historic responsibility to eastern Europe, to economic efficiency in the EU, and to 
wanting to transcend the nation-state by example—and gives the German government proper 
recognition for so doing—it can effect a major change in German policy toward internal EU 
arrangements. Obviously, managing this process from the nadir of German-American relations in the 
September 2002-February 2003 period is a matter of difficult diplomacy, but it is manageable. In fact, 
diplomacy can achieve more by emphasizing common ground and progress on the economic issues and 
by relieving some stresses around the world that will soon come to boil without growth and adjustment 
in the G-7, than by crying “Old Europe” and seemingly endorsing Germany’s economic decline. 
Fourth, encourage liberalization without being sanctimonious. US economic performance in 
the 1990s and its military predominance have converged with a moralistic tone in US foreign policy to 
make US-supported liberalization extremely unpopular. The United States would do better to pick 
specific areas in which economic reform will play a strategic purpose, particularly in saving Germany 
from stagnation, instead of being triumphalist about its superior “model.” This has an additional 
advantage of being more persuasive to Germans and Europeans in general since this brings home that 
there are countries doing much better than Germany (Ireland and the Netherlands, for example) as a 
result of constructive reform without converging completely on some American ideal. This agenda 
would include encouraging free international competition for pension fund and investment 
management, reducing agricultural subsidies and barriers, creating non-aggression pacts between rich 
countries of no new trade protections or corporate bailouts (rather than encouraging their escalation as 
                                                 
35 “They [the US and EU] need to start thinking of themselves as an informal ‘G-2’ steering committee for 
the global system…On issues where Europe speaks with a single voice, and has been able to translate its 
economic weight into negotiating leverage, a G-2 already exists…The European Union’s current 
constitutional convention offers an opportunity that must be seized to consolidate its external 
representation.” C. Fred Bergsten, “The Transatlantic Century,” Washington Post, April 30, 2002, p. A19.   27
the United States did with its 2002 steel tariffs and farm bill), and pushing through some form of 
renewed international banking standards (a Basle II with teeth but fewer complications, for example). 
All of these would directly or indirectly lead to greater openness, financial stability, citizen risk-taking, 
and macroeconomic stimulus in Germany and in a more unified, less statist, European Union. Table 1   Exports to Germany     
Exporting country 
Exports as a percent of total 
exports  
Exports as a percent of 
GDP 
United States  3.90%  0.30% 
France  16.36%  3.63% 
Benelux  24.09%  15.21% 
Italy  15.60%  3.36% 
United Kingdom  11.97%  2.26% 
Russia  8.29%  3.21% 
Turkey  19.00%  3.53% 
EU accession countries  31.31%  11.11% 
     
 
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, January 2003: Exports to Germany (line 70 DZD 134) 
and imports from Germany (line 71 DZD 134); and IMF, IFS, January 2003: Exports (line 70 
DZF), imports (line 71 DZF), gross domestic product (line 99B ZF) and exchange rate with US 









  Net ODA 
Percent of gross 
national income 
Percent of G-7 total net 
ODA 
  (US $ millions)     
United States  10176.50  0.10  25.23 
Germany  5178.28  0.27  12.84 
France  4647.36  0.34  11.52 
United Kingdom  4168.83  0.29  10.34 
Italy  1602.98  0.14  3.97 
Canada  1660.88  0.25  4.12 
Japan  12892.68  0.28  31.97 
G-7 Total  40327.51    100 
       
 
Source: http://www.oecd.org/xls/M00037000/M00037866.xls, Table 4: Net Official Development 
Assistance from DAC Countries to Developing Countries and Multilateral Organisations. Table 3  Defense spending (average 1997-2001)       




billions)   As a percent of GDP 
As a percent of total 
NATO spending 
Number of active military                                   
personnel                             
(thousands) 
United States  301.99  3.16  64.74  1,499 
Germany  27.46  1.52  5.89  324.68 
France  33.66  2.72  7.22  421.36 
United Kingdom  34.4  2.54  7.37  218.12 
Italy  21.02  2  4.51  393.5 
Turkey  7.36  4.98  1.58  798.48 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland  5.61  1.98  1.20  287.36 
Japan   39.9  1  n/a  238.2 
Canada  8  1.22  1.72  59.88 
 
 
Note: The defense spending data was calculated in 2001 dollars in billions with 2001 exchange rates.  For Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, data were available only 
for 1999-2001. 
 
Source: Report on Allied Contribution to the Common Defense, A Report to the United States Congress from the Secretary of Defense, June 2002, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2002/allied2002.pdf, Table E-4 (Defense Spending), Table E-5 (Defense Spending as a percent  of GDP) and Table E-8 
(Active-Duty Military Personnel). Table 4   Financial performance of German and eurozone banks (average 1997-2001)   
 
Cost to 
income         
ratio  
Liquid assets /                                  
customer 





Return on equity 
(ROE) 
         
Average of largest German banks  57.76  18.65  0.20  4.76 
Average of largest non-German eurozone banks  64.36  30.43  0.66  14.18 
         
 
Note: The unweighted average was computed for each group of banks from 1997-2001. The same 10 German banks are included in each column; 
due to data limitations, the sample includes 39 non-German eurozone banks in column 1, 28 in column 2, and 37 in columns 3 and 4. 
 
Source: European Central Bank, Monthly Report, "Indicators of the 50 largest euro area banks' liquidity, asset quality, profitability, and solvency," 
August 2002, Table 2, p. 58, http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/mb200208en.pdf.  


















































Source: IMF, IFS, January 2003, International Investment Position.  Direct Investment Abroad as a percentage of GDP was calculated from direct investment 
abroad (line 134 79 ABD ZF for Germany and line 158 79 ABD ZF for Japan) converted to national currency with IFS line AE (for Germany through 1998 and  













































































































































  Note: Direct investment includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital and financial derivatives associated 
with various intercompany transactions between affiliated enterprises, but excludes flows of direct investment capital 
into the reporting economy for exceptional financing, such as debt-for-equity swaps. 
 
Source: IMF IFS, January 2003, International Investment Position.  Gross  Direct Investment as a percentage of GDP 
was calculated by taking the absolute value of the sum of Direct Investment Abroad (line 134 79 ABD ZF for Germany 
and line 158 79 ABD ZF for Japan)  and Direct Investment in the Reporting Economy (line 134 79 LBD ZF for 
Germany and line 158 79 LBD ZF for Japan) converted to the national currency with IFS line AE (for Germany through 
1998 and Japan) and EA (for Germany after 1998) and then divided by national GDP figures (line 134 99b ZF and ZW 

























































































































































































































Source: Bundesbank at http://www.bundesbank.de/stat/zeitreihen/index.htm (WU3141, 1987=1000) and Bank of Japan at 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/down/dlong_f.htm.



































































































































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank from ECB Monthly Bulletin, August 2002.
 Figure 5  Amount of total credit by bank type to 










































































































































































































Note: Data is quarterly.  Non-financial services include "housing enterprises, holding companies, other real estate enterprises, restaurants 
and hotels, computer and related activities, research and development (plus other business activities (except investment companies)), 
health, veterinary and social work (enterprises and the professions), letting of movables and other services.  From 1999, this category has  
included finance leasing institutions." 
 
























































Source: World Development Indicators, http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. The ratio of bank assets to reserves is 
defined as the ratio of domestic currency holdings and deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other 
governments, nonfinancial public enterprises, the private sector and other banking institutions.  




























































Source: IMF IFS, January 2003, Monetary Survey and Country Tables for Germany and Japan.  Domestic credit (line 134 32 ZF and 134 32 ZW  
for Germany and line 158 32 ZF for Japan) is defined as the sum of claims on central government, claims on state and local governments, claims 
on non-financial public enterprises, claims on private sector, claims on other banking institutions and claims on non-bank financial institutions.  




Figure 8  Year-over-year change in seasonally adjusted household 






























































































































































































































Note: Data is annual. The 1991 figure was excluded due to the effects of re-unification. 
 
Source: IMF IFS, January 2003, National Accounts, Germany (Household Consumption Expenditure,  
Seasonally Adjusted, 134 96F.CZF and Market Rate EA to convert DM to ecu/euros). 
 